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On	method			Writing	about	a	’critical	legal	method’	with	which	to	address	the	question	of	lay	participation	in	law	proves	to	be	problematic	for	a	number	of	different	reasons.	What	does	’critical’	mean	in	this	context?	For	one	thing,	‘critical	judgement’	is	a	generic	intellectual	skill	that	all	researchers	are	supposed	to	be	able	to	apply	in	relation	to	the	object	of	their	research.	For	example,	the	Bologna	Process	Qualifications	Framework	includes	amongst	the	skills	required	at	the	third	cycle	(i.e.	the	doctoral	level)	the	capacity	for	“critical	analysis,	evaluation	and	synthesis	of	new	and	complex	ideas”.1		In	this	sense	all	research	at	the	doctoral	level	is	expected	to	be	‘critical’.	But	’critical	analysis’	as	a	generic	research	skill	can	hardly	pass	for	what	we	mean	by	a	’critical	method’	in	this	instance.	The	latter	implies	a	more	radical	and	focused	perspective	to	the	matter	at	hand.	We	can,	for	example,	imagine	a	researcher	who	rejects	the	internal	perspective	that,	according	to	the	legal	positivist	HLA	Hart,	was	the	’properly’	legal	perspective.2	Internally	viewed	in	Hart’s	sense	the	legal	system	will	always	appear	as	a	fundamentally	legitimate	way	of	regulating	society.	Like	a	participant	in	a	game	we	are	required	to	acknowledge	the	rules	if	we	want	to	play.	And	so	the	researcher	will	be	stuck	with	tinkering	with	minor	reforms	that	may	or	may	not	improve	whatever	political	ends	lay	participation	was	intended	to	achieve.	But	adopting	an	external	perspective,	that	is,	an	approach	that	is	not	’properly’	legal	in	Hart’s	sense,	will	emancipate	the	researcher	from	her	obligations	towards	the	law.	It	allows	her	to,	for	example,	evaluate	lay	participation	in	relation	to	democratic	ideals	that	are	not	extracted	from	the	law	itself.	We	could	argue	that	the	commitment	to	an	internal	perspective	that	Hart	and	his	positivist	followers	demand	of	the	legal	researcher	makes	us	blind	to	social	and	political	practices	that	we	as	critics																																																									1	See	http://www.bologna-bergen2005.no/EN/BASIC/050520_Framework_qualifications.pdf.	2	H.L.A.	Hart,	The	Concept	of	Law	(2nd	edn	Oxford	University	Press,	Oxford	1997)	88-91.	See	also	Scott	J.	Shapiro,	'What	Is	the	Internal	Point	of	View?'	(2006)	75	Fordham	Law	Review	1157-70.	
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should	become	aware	of.	It	is	in	this	very	sense	that	the	German	political	philosopher	Jürgen	Habermas	claimed	that	the	motivation	or	’knowledge	interest’	of	all	critical	research	is	’emancipatory’:		The	methodological	frame	which	settles	the	meaning	of	the	validity	of	this	category	of	critical	statements	can	be	explained	in	terms	of	the	notion	of	self-reflection.	This	frees	the	subject	from	dependence	on	hypostatized	forces.	Self-reflection	is	influenced	by	an	emancipatory	concern	with	knowledge	…3		Habermas’s	notion	of	critical	research	as	self-reflection	with	an	emancipatory	objective	comes	already	close	to	the	political	connotations	that	we	associate	the	word	with	today.	In	common	usage	’critical’	often	refers	to	a	practice	of	’criticism’,	something	that	the	German	political	philosopher	Theodor	Adorno	somewhat	pejoratively	described	as	”judging	intellectual	phenomena	in	a	subsumptive,	uninformed	and	administrative	manner	and	assimilating	them	into	the	prevailing	constellations	of	power	which	the	intellect	ought	to	expose.”4	In	other	words,	’criticism’	can	be	a	rather	simplistic	albeit	well-meaning	attempt	to	rectify	social	wrongs	that	is	motivated	by	the	researcher’s	personal	commitments	rather	than	any	academically	informed	encounter	with	society.	In	the	eyes	of	the	legal	orthodoxy	this	personal	and	’subjective’	commitment	makes	critical	research	suspect.	But	if	we	understand	the	word	’critical’	as	something	relating	to	’critique’	rather	than	’criticism’,	then	we	seem	to	be	back	at	square	one.	Wouldn’t	all	research	need	to	be	’critical’	as	the	etymology	of	the	word	already	indicates?5	Isn’t	’critiquing’	the	very	definition	of	all	legal	research	worth	its	name?																																																									3	Jürgen	Habermas,	'Knowledge	and	interest'	(1966)	9	Inquiry:	An	Interdisciplinary	Journal	of	Philosophy	285-300,	294.	4	Theodor	W.	Adorno,	'Cultural	Criticism	and	Society',	Prisms.	Trans.	SM	Weber	and	S	Weber	(MIT	Press,	Cambridge,	MA	1984)	30.	5	The	etymology	of	both	’critique’	and	’criticism’	is	from	the	Greek	verb	
krinein,	’to	set	apart’,	’to	discern’,	’to	judge’.	
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A	further	problem	arises	from	the	breadth	of	our	critique.	Is	it	enough	to	investigate	’critically’	the	object	of	our	research,	lay	participation	in	law	in	our	case?	For	if	we	are	to	adopt	a	truly	critical	position,	then	wouldn’t	remaining	consistently	critical	require	us	to	also	address	the	limitations	of	the	various	’methods’	or	perspectives	that	are	at	our	disposal?	And	wouldn’t	this	have	to	include	any	’critical	legal	method’	itself?	Can	a	’critical’	perspective	in	the	more	substantive	meaning	alluded	to	by	Adorno	have	a	’method’	to	begin	with?	The	somewhat	illusory	idea	of	a	coherent	’critical	legal	method’	is	reinforced	by	the	notion	that	there	is	a	’movement’	behind	it.	Just	like	a	socio-legal	method	presumes	a	corresponding	movement,	be	it	socio-legal	or	the	sociology	of	law,	a	critical	method	seems	to	refer	to	some	similar	movement	that	is	identifiably	’critical’.	The	modern	story	of	critical	research	in	law	is	often	compressed	into	a	Critical	Legal	Studies	(CLS)	movement	that	supposedly	reflects	what	contemporary	’critiquing’	is	all	about.6	But	one	could	also	well	claim	that	the	CLS	movement	was	never	really	a	proper	’movement’.	It	was,	rather,	a	community	of	loosely	affiliated	individuals	who	worked	mainly	in	North	American	law	schools	from	the	late	1970s	to	the	mid	1980s	representing	various	non-doctrinal	approaches.	Although	CLS	researchers	were	politically	all	clearly	left-of-centre,	their	political	kinship	was	never	enough	to	consolidate	the	various	approaches	into	a	’method’.	Instead	there	were	’methods’,	ranging	from	Marxist7	and	feminist8	to	deconstruction,9	that	were	often	incompatible	with	each	other.																																																									6	Textbooks	and	readers	will	often	include	a	section	on	the	CLS.	On	CLS	generally,	see	e.g.	Roberto	Mangabeira	Unger,	'The	Critical	Legal	Studies	Movement'	(1983)	96	Harvard	Law	Review	561-675,	Mark	Kelman,	A	Guide	to	
Critical	Legal	Studies	(Harvard	University	Press,	Cambridge,	MA	1987),	Mark	Tushnet,	'Critical	Legal	Studies:	An	Introduction	to	Its	Origins	and	Underpinnings'	(1986)	36	Journal	of	Legal	Education	505-17	and	Mark	Tushnet,	'Critical	Legal	Studies:	A	Political	History'	(1991)	100	Yale	Law	Journal	1515-44.	7	E.g.	William	J.	Chambliss,	Law,	Order,	and	Power	(2nd	edn	Addison-Wesley,	Reading,	MA	1982).	8	E.g.	Catharine	A.	MacKinnon,	'Feminism,	Marxism,	Method,	and	the	State:	Toward	Feminist	Jurisprudence'	(1983)	8	Signs	635-58.	
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As	two	leading	figures	of	the	’movement’,	Duncan	Kennedy	and	Karl	E.	Klare,	say	in	an	early	CLS	bibliography	(a	valuable	research	tool	in	itself):		CLS	scholarship	has	been	influenced	by	a	variety	of	currents	in	contemporary	radical	social	theory,	but	does	not	reflect	any	agreed	upon	set	of	political	tenets	or	methodological	approaches.	Quite	the	contrary,	there	is	sharp	division	within	the	CLS	movement	on	such	matters.	CLS	has	sought	to	encourage	the	widest	possible	range	of	approaches	and	debate	within	a	broad	framework	of	a	commitment	to	democratic	and	egalitarian	values	and	a	belief	that	scholars,	students,	and	lawyers	alike	have	some	contribution	to	make	in	the	creation	of	a	more	just	society.10		The	starting	point	of	this	chapter	is	the	claim	that	all	legal	methods,	be	they	conventional	or	allegedly	’critical’,	impose	limitations	into	the	ways	in	which	the	researcher	produces	legal	knowledge.	In	scientific	practice	a	method	is	a	mechanism	with	which,	amongst	other	things,	the	personal	and	’subjective’	views	of	the	researcher	are	supposedly	filtered	out	producing	allegedly	’objective’	knowledge.	’Methodologically’	conducted	research	does	not	produce	mere	opinions	but,	so	the	argument	runs,	scientifically	valid	knowledge.	A	’critical	legal	method’,	if	there	is	such	a	thing,	would,	then,	be	no	different.	Textbooks	in	the	area11	are	cluttered	with	the	nomenclature	of	acceptable	frameworks	for	critical	’methods’,	and	in	its	insistence	on	complying	with	them,																																																																																																																																																															9	E.g.	Jack	M.	Balkin,	'Deconstructive	Practice	and	Legal	Theory'	(1987)	96	Yale	Law	Journal	743-86.	10	Duncan	Kennedy	and	Karl	E.	Klare,	'A	Bibliography	of	Critical	Legal	Studies'	(1984)	94	Yale	Law	Journal	461-90,	461-2.	A	similar	critical	bibliography	was	compiled	for	at	least	international	law.	See	David	Kennedy	and	Chris	Tennant,	'New	Approaches	to	International	Law:	A	Bibliography'	(1994)	35	Harvard	International	Law	Journal	417-60.	11	E.g.	Ian	Ward,	Introduction	to	Critical	Legal	Theory	(2nd	edn	Cavendish	Publishing,	London	et	al	2004)	and	Costas	Douzinas	and	Adam	Gearey,	Critical	
Jurisprudence.	The	Political	Philosophy	of	Justice	(Hart,	Oxford	2005).	
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critical	legal	research	can	often	be	just	as	orthodox	in	its	approach	as	its	more	conformist	cousins.	It	seems	that	it	is,	indeed,	next	to	impossible	to	be	’critical’	of	the	’critical’	without	turning	into	a	reactionary.	This	chapter	will	try	to	argue	that	the	essence	of	’critique’	makes	the	very	idea	of	a	’legal	method’	problematic,	and	that	a	’critical’	perspective	to	law	can	only	be	more	like	an	’attitude’	than	a	scientifically	motivated	methodic	approach.	Without	reverting	back	to	the	’anything	goes’	of	Paul	Feyerabend’s	methodological	anarchism12,	I	will,	however,	try	to	show	how	the	insistence	on	following	methodological	rules	guides	the	production	of	legal	knowledge	towards	the	conformity	of	legal	orthodoxy,	and	this	would	apply	to	a	’critical’	method	just	as	well	as	to	any	other.	In	this	sense	the	aim	of	this	chapter	is	’emancipatory’.	And	curiously	enough,	I	will	further	argue	that	an	awareness	of	tradition	will	provide	one	way	of	breaking	away	from	that	conformity.		
'Before	you	can	break	the	rules,	you	have	to	know	what	the	rules	are.'			My	own	doctoral	thesis	was	criticized	for	the	emphasis	that	it	put	on	19th	and	early	20th	century	German	jurisprudence.	At	least	to	some	extent,	that	emphasis	has	remained	in	my	subsequent	work.	But	the	’dead	German	men’	are	there	for	a	reason.	They	are	present	in	my	work	because	they	represent	a	tradition	that	I	am	trying	to	break	away	from.	It	is	the	‘baggage’	of	tradition	that	even	a	critic	inevitably	carries	with	her.	Because	to	be	critical	is	always	to	be	critical	of	something,	and	as	long	as	a	given	approach	maintains	a	critical	relationship	with	whatever	it	is	a	departure	from,	then	the	tradition	will	impose	itself	on	the	critical	researcher	in	one	way	or	another.	The	possible	benefit	of	such	encounters	with	‘dead	German	men’	is	to	better	understand	how	that	tradition	imposes	itself	on	the	legal	researcher	in	general	and,	in	this	case,	on	the	critical	legal	researcher	in	particular.	Understanding	the	tradition	will	not,	perhaps,	be	able	to	immediately	determine																																																									12	Paul	Feyerabend,	Against	Method	(4th	edn	Verso,	London	and	New	York	2010).	
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what	a	critical	legal	perspective	to	lay	participation	in	law	is	or	ought	to	be,	but	it	will	hopefully	be	able	to	point	to	possible	ways	of	departing	from	an	orthodoxy	than	dominates	legal	research	and,	at	the	same	time,	to	also	reduce	the	risk	of	being	segregated	into	a	critical	ghetto	reserved	only	for	the	like-minded.	The	critical	legal	researcher	will	always	run	the	risk	of	being	either	’defined	in’	or	’defined	out’,	of	being	either	absorbed	and	neutralized	by	her	political	adversaries	or	excluded	into	a	meaningless	and	ineffectual	existence	outside	of	what	is	regarded	as	valuable	academic	work.13	But	an	approach	that	will	be	able	to	address	the	legal	tradition	on	its	own	terms	will	hopefully	also	identify	avenues	for	critical	departures	that	remain	relevant.	Indeed,	calls	for	critical	departures	in	law	are	often	explicitly	spelled	out	with	reference	to	tradition.	This	can	be	illustrated	with	the	help	of	two	hypothetical	questions	that,	no	doubt,	most	critically	minded	legal	researchers	have	encountered	in	one	form	or	another.	Firstly,	how	do	we	overcome	tradition?	And	secondly,	how	can	we	change	law?	The	first	question,	now	reformulated	within	the	framework	of	this	chapter	–	How	can	critical	legal	research	overcome	tradition?	–	is	in	fact	rhetorical	in	so	far	as	it	also	presents	at	least	two	claims.	Firstly,	it	suggests	that	it	is	necessary	to	overcome	tradition,	if	not	in	its	entirety,	then	at	least	selectively.	To	be	critical	in	legal	research	is	often	understood	as	being	critical	of	a	traditional	way	of	doing	things.	But	secondly,	the	claim	also	implies	that	there	is	something	in	tradition	that	resists	the	necessary	change.	Even	if	the	need	for	another	approach	may	well	be	recognized,	tradition	presents	itself	as	an	impediment,	and	it	will	want	to	have	its	say	before	the	overenthusiastic	critic	causes	any	serious	damage.	In	other	words,	the	question	‘How	can	critical	legal	research	overcome	tradition?’	is	articulated	in	the	tension	between	the	demands	of	the	future	and	the	obligations	to	yesteryear.	The	second	question,	once	again	reformulated	–	How	can	critical	legal	research	change	law?	–	could	perhaps	be	inferred	from	the	first.	Once	the	need	for	change	and	the	possible	obstacles	have	been	recognized	and	identified,	the																																																									13	See	Thomas	Mathiesen,	Law,	Society	and	Political	Action.	Towards	a	
Strategy	under	Late	Capitalism	(Academic	Press,	London	1980)	224-6.	
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critic	would	only	need	to	find	out	how	the	required	changes	can	come	about.	But	if	this	second	question	was	understood	so	literally,	the	reply	would	be	much	too	tautological.	For	the	critic	could	then	simply	answer:	‘Law	can	be	changed	by	researching	it	in	a	critical	way.’	However,	even	the	second	question	is	rhetorical.	It	also	implies	that	something	resists,	that	the	researcher’s	‘traditional’	way	of	doing	things	somehow	obliges,	and	that	it	is	not	simply	a	matter	of	‘doing	critical	legal	research’	but,	perhaps,	of	‘correcting	previous	mistakes’,	of	moving	forward	from	somewhere	rather	than	uprooting	oneself	completely.	Perhaps	in	a	way	that	is	similar	to	the	judiciary’s	commitment	to	’piecemeal	reform’,	to	use	Joseph	Raz’s	famous	expression14,	the	legal	researcher	is	expected	to	respect	the	democratic	mandate	of	the	legislator	and	to	move	forward	with	caution.	What	the	two	questions	have	in	common,	however,	is	the	notion	that	the	tradition	of	law	‘obliges’,	that	it	is,	in	a	manner	of	speaking,	a	’normative’	tradition.	A	normative	tradition	requires	adherence	to,	and	anyone	wishing	to	do	critical	research	in	law	will	sense	this.	And	it	is	the	normative	nature	of	that	tradition	that	this	chapter	will	take	up	in	more	detail.	How	does	the	normative	tradition	of	law	display	itself?	What	is	the	way	in	which	it	expresses	its	obligations	to	the	legal	researcher?	How	should	the	legal	critic	respond?	These	questions	will	first	be	examined	with	an	overview	and	interpretation	of	Hans	Kelsen’s	(1881	−	1973)	main	contribution	to	law,	namely	the	pure	theory	of	law.	Kelsen	published	two	editions	of	the	book:	a	short	first	edition	in	193415	and	a	considerably	enlarged	second	edition	in	1960	that	this	chapter	will	mainly	draw	on.16	In	addition,	many	other	works	by	Kelsen	contribute	towards	the	overall	theory.17	By	emphasizing	the	epistemological																																																									14	Joseph	Raz,	The	Authority	of	Law.	Essays	on	Law	and	Morality	(2nd	edn	Oxford	University	Press,	Oxford	2009)	196.	15	Hans	Kelsen,	Introduction	to	the	Problems	of	Legal	Theory	[1934].	Trans.	BL	Paulson	and	SL	Paulson	(Clarendon	Press,	Oxford	1992).	16	Hans	Kelsen,	Pure	Theory	of	Law.	Trans.	M	Knight	(University	of	California	Press,	Berkeley,	CA	1967).	17	For	example,	the	subtitle	of	Kelsen’s	book	on	sovereignty	from	1920	is	‘a	contribution	to	a	pure	theory	of	law.’	Hans	Kelsen,	Das	Problem	der	
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dimensions	of	Kelsen’s	theory,	I	will	focus	on	the	way	in	which	the	pure	theory	of	law	defines	its	‘logical’	framework.	My	claim	is	that	it	is	the	particular	way	in	which	Kelsen	understands	logic	that	accounts	for	the	normativity	of	the	tradition	that	he	both	establishes	and	represents.	Why	Kelsen?	The	pure	theory	of	law	and	the	legal	positivism	that	claims	to	be	its	successor	establish	a	tradition	that	we,	as	legal	researchers,	are	expected	to	follow.	It	is	the	doctrinal	or	’black	letter’	default	position	from	which	other	approaches	in	legal	research	are	regarded	as	deviations	and	departures.	Methodological	norms	and,	more	generally,	the	very	requirement	to	apply	a	method	to	legal	research	are	typically	at	the	heart	of	this	normative	tradition	that	we	are	supposed	to	honour.	Finally,	this	chapter	will	suggest	an	alternative	understanding	of	tradition,	inspired	by	Hans-Georg	Gadamer’s	(1900	−	2002)	philosophical	hermeneutics,	that	would	enable	critical	departures	from	the	tradition	without	having	to	fall	back	on	the	naïveté	of	criticism	that	Adorno	was	referring	to.		
Law	and	knowledge			It	would	be	difficult	to	overestimate	the	influence	of	neo-Kantian	philosophy	in	the	German	tradition	of	legal	positivism.	Oversimplifying	grossly,	the	neo-Kantians	wanted	to	establish	a	scientifically	valid	way	of	investigating	social	and	cultural	phenomena	such	as	law	so	that	the	resulting	humanities	and	social	sciences	would	not	have	to	pale	in	comparison	to	their	natural	science	counterparts.	In	many	ways,	neo-Kantianism	in	law	was	the	final	blow	that	ended	the	era	of	natural	law	that	had	been	losing	ground	in	legal	thinking	ever	since	the	heyday	of	Hegel.18	And	Kelsen	was	the	most	prominent	of	the	neo-																																																																																																																																																														
Souveränität	und	die	Theorie	des	Völkerrechts.	Beitrag	zu	einer	reinen	Rechtslehre	[1920]	(Scientia,	Aalen	1981).	18	There	was,	however,	a	revival	of	natural	law	thinking	in	post-war	Germany	even	if	its	effects	were	not	lasting.	This	was,	perhaps,	most	evident	in	
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Kantian	lawyers	although	his	affiliations	with	the	Marburg	school	of	the	movement	are	slightly	more	complicated	than	my	argument	here	would	imply.19	Nevertheless,	Kelsen’s	pure	theory	of	law	set	the	theoretical	stage	for	the	subsequent	developments	in	modern	law	on	the	European	mainland.	Although	Kelsen’s	immediate	influence	is,	perhaps,	more	easily	detectable	in	continental	European	or	South	American	legal	cultures,	Anglophone	legal	theorists	have	also	presented	their	interpretations	although	the	local	variant	of	legal	positivism	is	quite	different.20	How	does	the	pure	theory	of	law	define	itself?	Although	Kelsen	rarely	uses	the	term	‘philosophy	of	law’	but	instead	speaks	of	either	‘legal	doctrine’	or	the	‘science	of	law’,	the	aims	of	the	theory	are	clearly	defined	in	a	philosophical	tone:	 	As	a	theory,	its	exclusive	aim	is	to	know	and	to	describe	its	object.	The	theory	attempts	to	answer	the	question	what	and	how	law	is,	not	how	it	ought	to	be.	It	is	a	science	of	law	(jurisprudence),	not	legal	politics.21		In	order	to	be	able	to	appreciate	the	full	significance	of	Kelsen’s	undertaking,	it	is	worth	keeping	in	mind	—	and	perhaps	even	emphasizing	—	that	the	pure	theory	of	law	is	essentially	an	epistemological	project.	Its	aim	is	not	primarily	to	provide	judges	or	other	legal	actors	conceptual	tools	for	their	decisions	or																																																																																																																																																															the	‘turn’	of	Gustav	Radbruch,	a	neo-Kantian	jurisprudent	and	contemporary	of	Kelsen.	See	e.g.	Gustav	Radbruch,	'Statutory	Lawlessness	and	Supra-Statutory	Law	(1946)'	(2006)	26	Oxford	Journal	of	Legal	Studies	1-11.	19	See	e.g.	Stanley	L.	Paulson,	'The	Neo-Kantian	Dimension	of	Kelsen's	Pure	Theory	of	Law'	(1992)	12	Oxford	Journal	of	Legal	Studies	311-32.	20	See	e.g.	Hart,	The	Concept	of	Law,	292-7	which	are	the	footnotes	to	the	central	Chapter	VI,	and	Joseph	Raz,	The	Concept	of	a	Legal	System.	An	
Introduction	to	the	Theory	of	Legal	System	(2nd	edn	Clarendon	Press,	Oxford	1980)	93-120.	21	Kelsen,	Pure	Theory	of	Law,	1.	The	original	German	text	makes	no	reference	to	’jurisprudence’	which	has	been	added	by	the	translator.	
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interpretations	as	the	more	doctrinal	readings	of	Kelsen	have	often	implied.	In	the	long	run,	a	more	scientific	and	logical	exposition	of	the	law	may	well	benefit	both	legislators	and	judges,	but	this	is	merely	a	happy	consequence.	The	sole	
purpose	of	the	pure	theory	of	law	is	to	identify	its	objects	of	research,	that	is,	legal	
norms,	and	to	describe	them	in	a	scientifically	valid	way.	Within	its	overall	neo-Kantian	framework,	one	could	even	claim	that	the	aim	of	the	pure	theory	of	law	is	not	to	address	an	ontological	question	(‘What	is	law?’)	at	all	as	Kelsen’s	preamble	quoted	above	seems	to	suggest	but	to	determine	the	epistemological	preconditions	of	a	science	of	law.	Law,	then,	doesn’t	’exist’	as	such,	or,	more	precisely,	the	possible	‘existence’	of	law	is	subordinate	to	the	preconditions	of	knowing	about	it.	So	implicitly	Kelsen	rephrases	his	initial	question	about	the	’what’	of	law	thus:	’How	must	we	conceptualize	law	in	such	a	way	that	its	scientific	study	would	be	possible?’	Kelsen	is	obviously	captivated	by	the	possibility	of	knowing	about	law	in	a	scientific	way.	He	seems	to	be	well	aware	of	the	doubts	and	concerns	that	have	been	expressed	about	the	scientific	status	of	law,	and	he	acknowledges	that	law	has	often	been	accused	of	its	lack	of	methodological	precision	and	consistency.	The	adversaries	in	Kelsen’s	dispute	are	defined	in	a	neo-Kantian	manner	as	advocates	of	an	impure	’methodological	syncretism’	which	alludes	to	controversies	in	theology:		The	Pure	Theory	of	Law	undertakes	to	delimit	the	cognition	of	law	against	these	[PM:	other	non-legal]	disciplines,	not	because	it	ignores	or	denies	the	connection,	but	because	it	wishes	to	avoid	the	uncritical	mixture	of	methodologically	different	disciplines	(methodological	syncretism)	which	obscures	the	essence	of	the	science	of	law	and	obliterates	the	limits	imposed	upon	it	by	the	nature	of	its	subject	matter.22																																																										22	Kelsen,	Pure	Theory	of	Law,	1.	See	also	Deryck	Beyleveld	and	Roger	Brownsword,	'Methodological	Syncretism	in	Kelsen's	Pure	Theory	of	Law'	in	SL	Paulson	and	BL	Paulson	(eds),	Normativity	and	Norms:	Critical	Perspectives	on	
Kelsenian	Themes	(Clarendon	Press,	Oxford	1998).	
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Kelsen	claims,	then,	that	it	is	the	‘subject	matter’	of	the	discipline	—	legal	norms	—	that	prescribes	its	method.	In	order	to	literally	‘purify’	law	from	alien	influences,	it	must	be	‘liberated’	from	everything	that	does	not	belong	to	its	object	of	study,	that	is,	legal	norms.	This	‘liberation’	is	curious	in	the	sense	that	it	implies	a	past	and	bygone	era	before	law	had	entangled	itself	with	the	two	main	problems	that	Kelsen	identifies,	namely	the	causal	explanatory	models	of	the	natural	sciences	and	the	‘ideological’	framework	of	the	social	sciences23.	It	is,	of	course,	clear	that	no	such	‘Golden	Age’	of	law	exists.	As	mentioned,	Kelsen’s	epistemological	undertaking	is	essentially	neo-Kantian.	For	Kant,	the	description	of	the	legal	norms	of	an	organized	society	would	not	have	constituted	knowledge	in	the	strict	sense	of	the	word	at	all	because	norms	cannot	be	explained	through	causal	relations.	In	Kantian	terms	a	legal	norm	belongs	to	the	world	of	practical	reason	where	an	effect	comes	about	autonomously	because	it	is	willed.	For	example,	morality	does	not	come	about	as	the	effect	of	a	cause	but	because	man	wills	it	autonomously	and	freely:	I	act	in	a	morally	significant	—	good	or	bad	—	way	because	I	’will’	to	do	so,	not	because	my	environment	compels	me	to	do	so.	And	one	cannot	’know’	about	this	domain	of	freedom,	only	’think’	it.	This	was	the	claim	that	the	neo-Kantians	wanted	to	refute	by	either	expanding	Kant’s	notion	of	theoretical	reason	and	knowledge	into	a	universal	epistemology	to	cover	even	normative	phenomena	(the	Marburg	approach)	or	by	developing	the	epistemological	preconditions	of	a	‘third	approach’	of	cultural	sciences	somewhere	between	theoretical	and	practical	reason	(the	Heidelberg	or	Baden	approach).24	But	for	Kelsen	the	normative	structure	of	society	seems	to	be	much	more	than	an	isolated	social	phenomenon	amongst	others.	Perhaps	one	could	go	so	far	as	to	claim	that	Kelsen	regards	legal	norms	significant	because	their	normativity	enables	the	scientific	description	of	society	as	a	whole:																																																										23	Kelsen,	Pure	Theory	of	Law,	75-6.	24	On	the	political	and	historical	significance	of	neo-Kantianism,	see	Chris	Thornhill,	German	Political	Philosophy.	The	Metaphysics	of	Law	(Routledge,	Abingdon	2007)	239-60.	
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If	it	is	said	that	a	certain	society	is	constituted	by	a	normative	order	regulating	the	mutual	behaviour	of	a	multitude	of	men,	one	must	remain	aware	that	order	and	society	are	not	two	different	things;	that	they	are	one	and	the	same	thing,	that	society	consists	in	nothing	but	this	order,	and	that,	if	society	is	designated	as	a	community,	then	essentially	that	which	these	men	have	‘in	common’	is	nothing	else	but	the	order	regulating	their	mutual	behaviour.25		In	other	words,	the	normative	order	is	society	and	vice	versa.	But	regardless	of	the	claims	that	the	pure	theory	of	law	makes	about	its	aims	at	the	outset,	Kelsen	then	proceeds	to	reassess	his	task	in	ever	more	epistemological	terms:	in	order	to	be	able	to	describe	that	society	in	a	scientifically	valid	way,	society	must	be	understood	as	a	normative	order.	The	specificity	of	law	can,	Kelsen	claims,	be	described	using	Kant’s	fundamental	distinction	between	the	‘is’	and	the	‘ought’,	between	what	is	factual	and	what	is	normative.	The	distinction	also	provides	the	criterion	with	which	we	can	distinguish	law	as	a	discipline	from	the	natural	sciences.	If	Kant	claimed	that	knowledge	was	possible	only	within	the	causal	relations	established	by	the	laws	of	nature,	Kelsen	is	a	typical	neo-Kantian	in	the	sense	that	he	is	trying	to	extend	the	main	claims	of	Kant’s	critical	method	to	the	study	of	normative	phenomena.	This	is	what	makes	the	pure	theory	of	law	scientific.	But	in	a	legal	science,	social	relations	cannot	be	understood	through	the	causes	and	effects	of	the	natural	sciences	because	they	are	exclusively	normative	phenomena.26	For	Kelsen,	then,	the	normativity	of	law	requires	a	specific	form	of	knowledge.		
The	logic	of	science			But	even	if	the	object	that	the	pure	theory	of	law	studies	is	normative,	scientific	knowledge	is	not.	Nor	can	it	be.	For	Kelsen	the	requirement	that	scientific																																																									25	Kelsen,	Pure	Theory	of	Law,	86.	26	Kelsen,	Pure	Theory	of	Law,	76.	
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knowledge	must	be	’objective’	precludes	any	normative	commitment	to	the	object	of	study	even	if	the	final	results	may	call	for	reform	and	allow	for	conclusions	de	lege	ferenda.	We	can,	for	example,	only	commit	ourselves	to	combatting	climate	change	after	’objective’	research	has	verified	the	phenomenon.	Similarly,	according	to	the	same	logic,	we	can	commit	ourselves	to	improving	the	participation	of	lay	persons	in	legal	decision-making	only	after	’objective’	research	has	verified	that	lay	persons	are,	indeed,	excluded.	So	how	can	one	be	objective	about	something	that	is	in	essence	a	norm?	Kelsen	tries	to	resolve	the	issue	by	making	a	distinction	between	a	legal	norm	and	what	has	been	translated	as	either	the	‘rule	of	law’	or,	more	appropriately,	the	‘reconstructed	legal	norm’	or	‘legal	proposition’.27	A	legal	norm	is	a	command	or	an	imperative,	and	it	is	also	the	sole	object	of	the	pure	theory	of	law.	The	legal	proposition,	on	the	other	hand,	is	an	objective	description	of	the	legal	norm,	and	it	commands	nothing.	The	legal	proposition	merely	associates	a	possible	act	with	a	possible	sanction	and	prepares	the	legal	norm	for	scientific	description.	Even	if	the	legal	norm	is	the	pure	theory’s	object	of	research,	it	cannot	be	identified	with	law	as	the	theory	understands	it.	The	pure	theory	of	law	describes	its	objects,	that	is,	legal	norms,	through	legal	propositions,	but	in	the	latter	the	normativity	of	the	‘ought’	serves	merely	a	descriptive	purpose.	The	legal	proposition,	on	the	other	hand,	can	only	describe	the	normative	relationship	of	the	‘ought’	between	act	and	sanction.	How	would	this	work	in	practice?	The	legal	norm	commands	or	entitles	to	associate	a	sanction	with	an	act:	‘If	act	x,	then	sanction	y	ought	to	follow.’	For	example,	the	crime	of	theft	ought	to	be	followed	by	the	sanction	that	is	prescribed	by	law.	But	as	a	descriptive	science,	the	pure	theory	of	law	cannot	‘endorse’	the	strong	normativity	of	the	legal	norm	(‘If	you	steal,	it	is	right	and	just	that	you	ought	to	be	punished	in	accordance	with	the	law.’)	but	can	only	describe	the	normative	content	of	the	legal	norm	through	the	legal	proposition	(‘The	law	regarding	theft	that	Parliament	has	passed	states	that	if	you	steal,	you	ought	to	be	punished	in																																																									27	On	the	problem	of	translating	Kelsen’s	term	Rechtssatz,	see	Kelsen,	
Introduction,	23,	footnote	0.	
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accordance	with	the	law,	but	as	a	science	that	merely	describes	these	norms	the	pure	theory	has	no	view	as	to	whether	you	should	or	shouldn’t.’):		The	jurist	who	describes	the	law	scientifically	does	not	identify	himself	with	the	legal	authority	enacting	the	norm.	The	rule	of	law	[PM:	the	legal	proposition]	remains	objective	description;	it	does	not	become	prescription.	The	rule	[PM:	the	legal	proposition]	does	no	more	than	state,	like	the	law	of	nature,	the	link	between	two	elements,	a	functional	connection.28		Legal	norms	do	not	come	about	’naturally’	as	effects	of	a	cause	but	are	’willed’	and	are	so	created	in	an	act.	In	other	words,	the	existence	of	a	will	is	always	a	precondition	of	law.	But	for	Kelsen	such	an	act	is	always	a	factual	phenomenon	whereas	the	outcome	of	a	legislative	will,	that	is,	the	legal	norm,	must	necessarily	be	normative.	Because	in	Kelsen’s	neo-Kantian	framework	one	cannot	bridge	the	worlds	of	the	’is’	and	the	’ought’,	of	factuality	and	normativity,	a	legal	norm	cannot	be	inferred	from	the	will	that	has	created	it.29	Consequently	the	validity	of	a	legal	norm	cannot	be	inferred	in	a	scientifically	acceptable	way	from	the	legislative	will	that	has	enacted	it	(’The	law	of	theft	is	valid	law	because	Parliament	has	so	decided.’).	Law	can	only	exist	if	the	legislator	has	willed	it,	but	that	is	not	the	source	of	its	validity.	It	is	valid	if	and	only	if	its	legislator	had	the	legal	competence	to	do	so:		...	the	norms,	whose	reason	for	validity	is	in	question,	originate	from	an	authority,	that	is,	from	somebody	competent	to	create	valid	norms;	this	norm	bestows	upon	the	norm-creating	personality	the	‘authority’	to	create	norms.	The	mere	fact	that	somebody	commands	something	is	no	reason	to	regard	the	command	as	a	‘valid’	norm,	a	norm	binding	the	individual	at	whom	it	is	directed.	Only	a	competent	authority	can	create	
																																																								28	Kelsen,	Pure	Theory	of	Law,	79.	29	Kelsen,	Pure	Theory	of	Law,	4-6.	
Minkkinen		16	
valid	norms;	and	such	competence	can	only	be	based	on	a	norm	that	authorises	the	issuing	of	norms.30		This	is	the	point	from	which	Kelsen	constructs	his	infamous	Stufenbau,	the	hierarchical	and	layered	structure	of	higher	and	lower	legal	norms	that	accounts	for	the	normativity	of	all	legal	norms.	The	validity	of	a	lower	norm	can	only	be	inferred	from	a	competence	to	enact	that	norm	that	was	authorized	by	a	higher	norm.	For	example,	local	government	is	authorized	to	make	byelaws	concerning	the	prevention	of	nuisances	only	because	the	Local	Government	Act	1972,	a	law	enacted	by	Parliament,	authorizes	local	government	to	do	so.	So	a	byelaw	regulating	the	use	of	skateboards	in	public	parks	is	valid	as	a	legal	norm	because	a	higher	law,	the	Local	Government	Act	1972,	grants	local	government	the	legal	authority	to	regulate	such	issues.	Parliament,	on	the	other	hand,	can	give	local	government	this	delegated	authorization	through	the	Local	Government	Act	1972	in	a	valid	way	only	because	a	constitution	establishes	the	legislative	powers	of	Parliament.	In	this	way,	lower	and	higher	norms	are	always	in	a	logical	relation	to	one	another.	In	order	to	be	normatively	valid,	a	norm	must	always	refer	logically	to	a	higher	norm	of	competence.	Hence:	’The	law	of	theft	is	valid	law	because	Parliament	that	enacted	it	had	the	constitutional	competence	to	do	so.’	 But	this	logical	hierarchy	cannot	be	followed	through	ad	infinitum.	Indeed,	the	constitution	provides	the	ultimate	framework	for	legal	norms	from	which	the	validity	of	lower	norms	can	be	logically	inferred.	As	far	as	positive	law	is	concerned,	there	cannot	be	anything	above	the	constitution.	But	in	order	for	the	pure	theory	of	law	to	meet	the	scientific	criteria	that	Kelsen	has	set	for	it,	even	the	highest	positive	norms	must	logically	infer	their	validity	from	something	higher.	So	what	could	possibly	be	above	the	constitution?	Surely	not	God	or	natural	law	if	we	are	to	take	scientific	objectivity	as	a	starting	point.	In	order	to	comply	with	the	demands	of	his	own	theory	and	to	avoid	the	abyss	of	eternal	regression,	Kelsen	then	makes	a	distinction	between	the																																																									30	Kelsen,	Pure	Theory	of	Law,	194.	
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constitution	in	its	material	or	positive	meaning	and	the	constitution	in	its	formal	or	logical	meaning.	The	constitution	in	its	logical	meaning	includes	within	itself	a	
basic	norm	that	the	pure	theory	of	law	must	presuppose	in	order	to	remain	scientific.	All	normativity	in	law	flows	from	it.	The	basic	norm	is	the	normative	foundation	of	the	act	of	positive	legislation.31	Time	and	time	again	Kelsen	emphasizes	that	the	basic	norm	does	not	involve	the	recognition	of	any	ethical	standard	that	is	transcendent	in	relation	to	positive	law.	So	it	does	not	and	cannot	measure	the	acceptability	of	positive	law.	In	other	words,	the	basic	norm	cannot	be	a	foundational	norm	of	natural	law	as	many	of	Kelsen’s	readers	have	attempted	to	either	understand	it	or	to	criticize	it.	The	basic	norm	is	only	an	epistemological	necessity.	It	is	the	‘transcendental-logical’	precondition	of	the	pure	theory	of	law.	The	basic	norm	is	not	‘willed’	in	the	same	way	as	conventional	legal	norms,	but	it	is	required	by	the	science	of	law.	By	presuming	the	existence	of	the	basic	norm,	the	pure	theory	of	law	establishes	and	fixes	its	own	normative	logic	and	its	scientific	validity.32		It	is,	however,	problematic	to	insist	on	such	a	sharp	distinction	between	‘willing’	and	‘presuming’.	Could	we	not	say	that	the	pure	theory	of	law	legislates	its	own	basic	norm?	In	1963,	only	three	years	after	the	publication	of	the	enlarged	second	edition	of	his	book,	Kelsen	had	to	revise	his	own	position	on	the	basic	norm.	Kelsen	was	originally	uncomfortable	with	what	the	neo-Kantians	called	‘fictions’.33	In	neo-Kantian	epistemology,	a	fiction	is	a	heuristic	conceptual	tool	that	enables	one	to	conceive	of	something	as	knowledge.	It	is	the	equivalent	of	Kant’s	‘as	if’	(als	ob)	postulate	that	even	Kelsen	himself	makes	a	reference	to.34	But	now,	in	order	to	account	for	the	‘non-willed’	basic	norm,	Kelsen	must	resort	to	a	‘double-fiction’:																																																									31	Kelsen,	Pure	Theory	of	Law,	200.	32	Kelsen,	Pure	Theory	of	Law,	201-5.	33	See	Kelsen,	Pure	Theory	of	Law,	299-302.	34	Hans	Kelsen,	Reine	Rechtslehre	(2nd	edn	Verlag	Österreich,	Wien	2000)	99.	This	is	one	of	the	many	footnotes	that	have	been	omitted	from	the	English	translation.	A	typical	legal	fiction	would	be	corporate	personhood	that	enables	legal	thinking	to	conceive	of	the	rights	and	obligations	of	corporations.	
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	The	basic	norm	is	a	fictive	norm,	and	it	requires	a	fictive	act	of	will	that	posits	the	norm.	It	is	a	fiction	according	to	which	some	authority	wills	the	norm	to	exist.35		In	this	case,	the	fictive	nature	of	the	basic	norm	itself	as	a	‘transcendental-logical	presumption’	is	fairly	easy	to	fathom	because	it	is	not	part	of	positive	law	itself.	We	must	simply	assume	’as	if’	the	basic	norm	existed,	for	otherwise	the	normativity	that	the	pure	theory	of	law	is	trying	to	scientifically	describe	would	be	impossible.	But	in	order	to	establish	the	scientific	validity	of	the	theory,	Kelsen	must	now	also	postulate	a	fictive	will	‘as	if’	an	authority	enacted	the	basic	norm.	But	clearly	this	authority	is	not	fictitious	at	all.	It	can	only	be	the	pure	theory	itself.	Through	its	own	allegedly	fictive	authority,	the	theory	establishes	its	own	object	of	research	by	enacting	the	basic	norm,	and	normativity,	the	supposedly	constitutive	element	of	all	social	life,	cannot	exist	outside	its	realm.		
How	we	'ought'	to	do	legal	science		The	critics	of	traditional	legal	approaches	may	not	wish	to	engage	with	Kelsen’s	pure	theory	because,	even	if	he	was	a	socialist	who	openly	sympathized	with	the	women’s	rights	movement	and	psychoanalysis	in	pre-war	Vienna,	his	special	brand	of	legal	positivism	apparently	has	preciously	little	to	say	about	the	social	and	political	concerns	that	usually	animate	the	critical	research	of	law.	And	as	a	primarily	epistemological	project	concerned	with	its	own	scientific	status,	it	does	not	lend	itself	easily	to	any	methodological	diversions.	Even	more	poignantly,	legal	critics	may	wish	to	deliberately	avoid	Kelsen	because	of	the	way	in	which	the	pure	theory	of	law	establishes	a	normative	tradition	that,	in	the	guise	of	knowledge	and	science,	tacitly	delimits	the	possibilities	of	critical	legal	research.	It	serves	as	a	model	of	the	way	in	which	the	orthodoxy	of	the	positivistic	tradition	in	law	in	general	regulates	the	production	of	legal	knowledge.																																																									35	Kelsen,	as	quoted	in	Franz-Martin	Schmöltz	(ed),	Das	Naturrecht	in	der	
politischen	Theorie	(Springer,	Wien	1963)	(my	translation).	
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But	conversely,	legal	critics	may	wish	to	deliberately	engage	with	the	pure	theory	of	law	—	or	any	other	tradition,	for	that	matter	—	in	order	to	be	able	to	better	understand	how	a	given	tradition	imposes	limits	and	regulates	legal	research.	In	Kelsen’s	case,	it	does	not	really	concern	an	‘ideology’	as	tempting	as	it	would	be	to	discard	him	simply	as	a	political	reactionary.	It	has	much	more	to	do	with	the	logical	framework	with	which	he	validates	his	epistemology.	In	other	words,	it	has	more	to	do	with	the	way	in	which	he	insists	that	we	follow	a	certain	positivistic	method	lest	we	end	up	with	something	deemed	’unscientific’.	The	strength	and	weakness	of	the	pure	theory	of	law	is	its	obsessive	belief	in	the	emancipatory	potential	of	scientific	knowledge,	and	this	belief	seems	to	justify	Kelsen’s	insistent	claim	that	all	legal	research	be	‘pure’.	How	does	Kelsen,	then,	construct	his	‘normative	tradition’?	In	another	instance,	Kelsen	claims	that	legal	research	must	be	‘normological’.36	His	thorny	term	brings	together	the	two	distinct	claims	that	his	pure	theory	of	law	makes.	Firstly,	he	asserts	that,	unlike	the	main	bulk	of	the	social	sciences	that	study	factual	social	phenomena,	law	is	a	normative	discipline.	This	meaning	of	the	word	’normative’	simply	means	that	law’s	object	of	study	is	legal	norms.	For	Kelsen,	law	as	an	academic	discipline	is	normative	in	much	a	similar	way	as	descriptive	ethics	that	studies	ethical	norms	without	really	telling	us	how	we	ought	to	act.	We	can,	for	example,	study	how	changes	in	public	morality	relate	to	attitudes	towards	minorities	without	assessing	the	resulting	attitudes	normatively	one	way	or	another.	Similarly	we	can	study	the	ideals	of	democracy	that	inform	views	on	lay	participation	in	law,	but	we	need	not	necessarily	take	a	stand	as	to	whether	we	should	endorse	one	or	the	other	ideal.	The	object	of	study	is	a	normative	phenomenon	even	if	the	science	that	studies	it	can	only	describe	it.	But	secondly,	Kelsen	also	claims	that	legal	norms,	the	object	of	the	normative	discipline,	must	be	in	logical	relationships	with	one	another.	Primarily	Kelsen	understands	this	‘logical’	requirement	to	mean	that	every	valid	norm																																																									36	I	have	dealt	with	this	question	from	a	slightly	different	perspective	elsewhere.	See	Panu	Minkkinen,	'Why	Is	Law	a	Normative	Discipline?:	On	Hans	Kelsen's	"Normology"'	(2005)	11	Res	Publica	235-49.	
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must	by	necessity	be	inferred	from	a	higher	norm.	Because	the	factual	is	so	categorically	distinct	from	the	normative	—	the	‘is’	from	the	‘ought’	—	Kelsen	insists	that	a	norm	cannot	be	‘logically’	inferred	from	factual	circumstances.	We	cannot,	for	example,	establish	that	a	given	legal	norm	is	valid	because	it	is	either	factually	enacted	by	the	legislative	will	of	Parliament	or	factually	observed	in	the	so-called	real	world.	As	a	legal	norm,	a	statute	can	be	valid	only	if	a	higher	norm	has	authorized	the	required	legislative	act.	For	Kelsen,	such	inter-normative	relations	are	the	‘logic’	of	law	as	a	normative	discipline.	This	is	where	the	allegedly	descriptive	pure	theory	becomes	prescriptive.	Legal	norms	and	their	logical	relationships	make	up	law	as	a	legal	system,	a	layered	or	hierarchical	structure	that	ascends	from	lower	norms	to	ever	higher	norms	until	it	reaches	the	hypothetical	and	presumed	basic	norm	sitting	at	the	summit	of	the	structure.	The	logical	character	of	the	legal	system	does	not	necessarily	refer	to	the	so-called	real	world	because	statutes	do	not	have	to	display	the	same	‘logical’	quality.	The	systematic	logic	is	first	and	foremost	a	prerequisite	of	law	as	a	science.	Notwithstanding	the	diverse	social	conventions	that	tend	to	acknowledge	one	approach	to	law	as	an	‘authority’	while	disregarding	others,	legal	doctrine	—	the	‘dogmatic’	tradition	on	the	Continent,	‘black	letter’	in	the	English-speaking	world	—	often	expresses	its	demands	for	such	a	systematic	logic	through	conceptual,	epistemological	and	methodological	rules	that	the	legal	researcher	must	take	into	consideration	if	she	wishes	her	work	to	be	acknowledged	as	law.	These	rules	are,	then,	normative	to	the	extent	that	they	‘ought’	to	be	followed,	and	in	Kelsen’s	scheme	they	constitute	a	second	normative	structure	in	addition	to	legal	norms	proper.	So	there	must	accordingly	be	two	normative	structures:	firstly,	the	legal	norms	that	constitute	the	object	of	the	pure	theory	of	law	and	that	are	merely	scientifically	described,	and	secondly,	the	systematic	logic	that	the	study	of	these	norms	requires	and	that	the	researcher	is	expected	to	follow.	The	requirement	to	observe	and	to	follow	a	legal	method	belongs	to	this	second	normative	structure.	Kelsen’s	pure	theory	of	law	is	much	richer	and	more	complex	than	the	preceding	overview	suggests.	But	for	the	sake	of	argument,	allow	me	to	condense	the	second	normative	structure,	that	is,	all	the	different	conceptual,	
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epistemological	and	methodological	rules	that	Kelsen	formulates	about	law	as	a	scientific	discipline	into	a	single	normative	claim:	‘Legal	research	ought	to	be	based	on	a	pure	theory	of	norms’.	We	can	modify	this	claim	into	more	familiar	variations,	as	well:	’For	the	purposes	of	research,	only	positive	law	can	be	regarded	as	law’.	Or:	’A	PhD	in	law	on	lay	participation	should	begin	with	an	analysis	of	the	relevant	primary	legislation.’	Kelsen	serves	here	merely	as	an	example,	for	similar	normative	claims	as	to	how	legal	research	‘ought’	to	be	done	can	be	found	regardless	of	what	more	or	less	conventional	tradition	one	is	talking	about.	A	researcher	with	a	socio-legal	bent	may	well	maintain	that	‘the	study	of	law	ought	to	be	founded	on	verifiable	social	facts’,	and	someone	who	finds	Dworkin	persuasive	might	claim	that	‘law	ought	to	concern	itself	with	legal	interpretation	emphasizing	liberal	political	values’.	Even	the	more	orthodox	strains	of	critical	legal	research	make	similar	normative	claims	such	as	’legal	norms	ought	to	be	analyzed	as	part	of	an	oppressive	political	economy’.	Regardless	of	what	the	contents	of	these	claims	are,	they	all	convey	a	tradition	in	terms	of	norms.	They	express	themselves	as	normative	traditions	that	‘ought’	to	be	recognized	and	upheld.	And	as	such,	they	also	regulate	and	moderate	any	demands	for	departures	into	other	directions.	The	legal	critic	could,	perhaps,	reject	or	disregard	a	given	tradition	simply	by	referring	to	its	conservative	or	conformist	tendencies.	But	that	would	be	the	easy	way	out.	If	the	pure	theory	of	law	imposes	itself	on	the	legal	researcher	as	a	normative	tradition	that	‘ought’	to	be	upheld	by	following	certain	conceptual,	epistemological	and	methodological	rules,	then	its	normativity	must	lie	in	the	way	in	which	it	constructs	the	logical	framework	through	which	these	rules	are	established	and	communicated.	In	other	words,	the	scientific	logic	of	legal	research	that	Kelsen	elaborates	and	advocates	makes	law	a	normative	and	prescriptive	discipline	that	tells	the	researcher	what	she	‘ought’	to	do.	How	does,	then,	the	pure	theory	of	law	with	its	conceptual,	epistemological	and	methodological	rules	address	us?	How	does	it	capture	us	into	a	world	where	we	are	told	what	to	do?	The	phenomenologist	philosopher	Edmund	Husserl	(1859	—	1938)	claims	that	the	scientific	logic	of	a	discipline	is	always	normative	because	its	aim	is	to	assess	the	extent	to	which	the	discipline	in	question	—	in	our	case	law	—	
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measures	up	to	its	own	’idea’.	In	other	words,	it	tells	us	what	the	’legal’	in	’legal	research’	is	and	sets	this	idea	of	the	’legal’	as	something	that	we	should	aspire	to.	Logic,	then,	both	evaluates	a	discipline	in	relation	to	its	ideal	form	and	conducts	it	into	that	direction37.	In,	for	example,	Kelsen’s	case,	the	claim	that	‘legal	research	ought	to	be	based	on	a	pure	theory	of	norms’	presupposes	that	one	approach	in	legal	research	may	be	‘purer’	than	another,	and	that	there	may	even	be	approaches	that	do	not	live	up	to	even	the	minimum	requirements	of	a	‘pure’	theory.	In	addition,	the	measuring	of	different	approaches	in	legal	research	implies	that,	to	stick	with	our	example,	a	‘purer’	approach	is	in	some	way	superior	to	an	approach	that	is	‘less	pure’:	it	is	’more	legal’,	‘more	accurate’,	‘more	scientific’,	‘more	useful’,	and	so	on.	All	in	all,	the	evaluations	and	judgements	are	normative	for	they	all	suggest	how	legal	research	‘ought’	to	be	conducted.	For	Husserl,	these	evaluations	and	judgements	form	together	a	normative	hierarchy	that	ends	up	being	very	much	like	Kelsen’s	hierarchy	of	legal	norms	where	the	validity	of	a	lower	norm	was	always	inferred	from	a	higher	one.	Evaluating,	for	example,	the	‘purity’	of	a	particular	approach	in	legal	research	is	namely	always	done	in	a	comparative	mode,	in	relation	to	an	approach	that	is	either	‘purer’	or	’less	pure’	than	the	one	being	evaluated.	Claiming,	for	example,	that	’the	level	of	purity	in	approach	x	is	high’	implies	that	there	is	an	approach	where	the	level	is	lower,	for	otherwise	the	assessment	would	have	been	impossible.	And	just	like	Kelsen,	Husserl	also	claims	that	in	making	such	comparisons	one	must	presuppose	a	basic	norm,	a	hypothetical	and	even	fictive	highest	norm	at	the	top	of	the	hierarchy	that	is	the	origin	and	the	source	of	all	normative	validity	within	the	structure.	Any	claim	about	the	level	of	purity	presupposes	the	existence	of	something	called	’purity’	even	if	we	can’t	say	exactly	what	it	is.	The	basic	norm	is,	then,	not	an	‘existing’	norm	but	a	presupposition	required	in	any	normative	discipline.38		
																																																								37	Edmund	Husserl,	Logical	Investigations.	Vol	1.	Prolegomena	to	Pure	
Logic.	Trans.	JN	Findlay	(Routledge	&	Kegan	Paul,	London	1970)	70-2.	38	Husserl,	Logical	Investigations,	85-6.	
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But	unlike	Kelsen,	Husserl	identifies	two	distinct	functions	in	his	basic	norm.	Firstly,	the	basic	norm	has	what	Husserl	calls	a	‘regulative’	function.	In	the	case	of	logic,	the	basic	norm	establishes	the	validity	with	which	the	various	normative	evaluations	and	judgements	within	the	hierarchy	can	perform	their	measuring	function	and	direct	a	given	approach	towards	the	ideal	form	of	the	discipline.	By	doing	so,	the	basic	norm	produces	unity	and	cohesion	within	the	discipline,	and	as	such,	it	contributes	to	the	development	of	a	disciplinary	tradition.	So,	for	example,	the	’logic’	of	the	pure	theory	that	includes	all	the	different	conceptual,	epistemological	and	methodological	rules	that	the	legal	researcher	is	supposed	to	take	into	account	gradually	directs	law	as	a	discipline	into	a	particular	direction.	But	secondly	and	more	importantly,	Husserl’s	basic	norm	also	includes	within	itself	a	‘constitutive	content’.	For	if	one	claims	that,	to	once	again	stick	with	our	example,	‘legal	research	ought	to	be	based	on	a	pure	theory	of	norms’,	the	claim	simultaneously	implies	that	such	an	approach,	namely	a	‘pure	theory	of	norms’,	has	something	unique	about	it.	It	must	by	necessity	somehow	stand	out	from	all	other	approaches.39	And	for	Husserl,	this	uniqueness,	whatever	it	may	substantially	be,	cannot	be	normatively	determined	through	the	regulative	function	of	the	basic	norm,	through	claims,	rules	and	propositions	that	tell	us	what	we	‘ought’	to	do	if	we	wish	our	approach	to	be	acknowledged	as,	for	example,	legal	research.	In	order	to	say	something	significant	about	its	normative	object,	law	requires	a	theoretical	elaboration	of	its	own	‘uniqueness’,	of	its	‘idea’.	To	paraphrase	Husserl,	all	normative	disciplines	require	knowledge	about	certain	non-normative	truths.	So	in	Husserl’s	terms,	Kelsen’s	‘normological’	tradition	of	legal	research	with	its	emphasis	on	the	necessity	to	follow	prescribed	methodological	rules	seems	to	only	recognize	the	regulative	function	of	the	basic	norm.	Indeed,	for	Husserl,	such	a	normative	tradition	could	not	even	be	scientific	in	any	profound	meaning	of	the	word.	Legal	research	would,	if	that	were	the	case,	be	reduced	to	a	mere	regulated	practice	the	premises	of	which	are	determined	elsewhere.	The	
																																																								39	Husserl,	Logical	Investigations,	87-8.	
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legal	researcher	would	simply	be	blindly	following	her	methodological	rules	without	ever	reflecting	on	what	they	are	meant	to	achieve	and	why.		
The	challenge	from	tradition			So	in	the	positivistic	variants	of	legal	research,	Kelsen	included,	tradition	is	often	understood	as	such	a	set	of	obliging	rules	that	regulate	the	work	of	the	researcher	and	direct	it	towards	something	that	is	itself	seldom	seriously	questioned.	In	other	words,	the	normative	tradition	of	legal	research	will	readily	tell	the	researcher	what	she	‘ought’	to	do,	but	it	is	less	willing	to	engage	in	any	’navel-gazing’	or	reflections	about	its	own	uniqueness	or	its	’idea’	even	if	the	individual	rules	must	by	necessity	be	inferred	from	that	uniqueness	and	not	vice	versa.	The	requirement	to	adopt	and	to	elaborate	a	method	of	research	to	investigate,	for	example,	lay	participation	in	law	is	typically	such	an	obliging	rule.	By	deviating	from	it,	the	researcher	runs	the	risk	of	having	her	work	excluded	from	the	main	body	of	legal	research	as	’impure’,	’unscientific’,	’not	law’,	or	with	a	number	of	other	pejorative	condemnations.	These	are	normative	traditions	of	research,	traditions	that	regulate	the	production	of	legal	knowledge	delimiting	the	options	of	critical	departures	and	consequently	also	keeping	a	check	on	what	is	to	be	regarded	as	scientifically	relevant	and	what	not.	And	to	reiterate,	the	orthodox	strains	in	critical	legal	research	are	no	different.	
My	claim	is	that	this	type	of	normative	and	‘regulative’	tradition	that	is	not	
complemented	by	genuine	theoretical	insights	about	the	discipline	in	general	is	not	
a	tradition	at	all.	Even	if	the	demands	of	a	normative	tradition	of	research	could	be	justified	from	a	practical	point	of	view,	it	is	never	enough.	Without	the	possibility	to	address	the	uniqueness	of	the	discipline,	the	‘idea’	of	law,	if	you	will,	the	researcher	is	lost	blindly	following	externally	imposed	rules	and	regulations	like	methods	without	knowing	why	they	are	there.	And	in	addition,	one	must	also	be	able	to	question	the	very	notion	of	a	tradition.	What	is,	then,	tradition?	How	does	tradition	display	itself	in	a	discipline	like	law	that	is	to	a	large	part	based	on	interpreting	texts?	
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Hans-Georg	Gadamer	(1900	—	2002)	is	considered	as	the	founder	of	philosophical	hermeneutics,	that	is,	the	philosophy	of	understanding	and	interpretation.	It	is	well	known	that	Gadamer	modeled	his	philosophical	hermeneutics	on	how	lawyers	intuitively	work	with	their	legal	texts:		Legal	hermeneutics	is	able	to	point	out	what	the	real	procedure	of	the	human	sciences	is.	Here	we	have	the	model	for	the	relationship	between	past	and	present	that	we	are	seeking.	The	judge	who	adapts	the	transmitted	law	to	the	needs	of	the	present	is	undoubtedly	seeking	to	perform	a	practical	task,	but	his	interpretation	of	the	law	is	by	no	means	on	that	account	an	arbitrary	re-interpretation.	Here	again,	to	understand	and	to	interpret	means	to	discover	and	to	recognise	a	valid	meaning.	He	seeks	to	discover	the	‘legal	idea’	of	a	law	by	linking	it	with	the	present.40		It	is	this	linking	of	past	and	present	that	Gadamer	understands	as	tradition.	And	he	has	often	—	too	hastily,	in	my	mind	—	been	accused	of	conservatism	because	of	this.41	Indeed,	the	word	’tradition’	does	easily	invoke	such	thoughts.	But	this	tradition	is	something	quite	different.	In	one	of	his	rare	poetic	moments,	Gadamer	describes	how	the	interpreter	becomes	aware	of	tradition	in	the	process	of	understanding.	When	we	confront	any	given	text,	we	approach	it	within	a	particular	situatedness	that	Gadamer	calls	a	horizon.	No	one	can	read	texts	in	a	vacuum,	and	our	understanding	is	always	conditioned	by	both	our	social	and	our	individual	circumstances.	A	horizon	may	always	be	changing,	but	it	includes	within	itself	all	the	prejudices	and	expectations	with	which	the	interpreter	approaches	her	text.	For	example,	I	am	an	educated	white	man	from	a	Northern	European	middle-class	background,	and	that	will	inevitably	affect	the	way	in	which	I	relate	to	lay	participation	in	law.	If	we	are,	for	example,	reading																																																									40	Hans-Georg	Gadamer,	Truth	and	Method	[1960].	Trans.	J	Weinsheimer	and	DG	Marshall	(Continuum,	London/New	York,	NY	2004)	292-3.	41	See	e.g.	John	D.	Caputo,	Radical	Hermeneutics.	Repetition,	
Deconstruction,	and	the	Hermeneutic	Project	(Indiana	University	Press,	Bloomington,	IN	1987)	108-19.	
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legislation	on	lay	participation	in	law,	a	self-professed	legal	critic	will	be	looking	for	different	emphases	than	her	more	conformist	counterpart.	For	my	part,	I	may	not	see	it	as	a	uniquely	positive	phenomenon	or	as	something	contributing	towards	democracy.	Because	of	my	situatedness	in	the	ideals	of	the	Scandinavian	welfare	state,	I	have	seen	how	a	well-educated	and	socially	representative	career	judiciary	has	been	able	to	promote	those	ideals,	and	I	may	be	less	keen	to	see	uninformed	lay	interference	than	someone	from,	say,	Britain	who	may	have	an	innate	distrust	of	an	elite	judiciary.	Although	we	all	approach	texts	from	our	particular	horizons,	Gadamer	insists	that	if	the	interpreter	genuinely	wishes	to	understand	her	text,	she	must	first	isolate	and	suspend	her	prejudices	until	they	have	properly	demonstrated	their	worth:	Is	lay	participation	really	’uninformed’?	Does	a	socially	representative	career	judiciary	really	endorse	welfare	state	values?	And	so	on.	Structurally	this	suspension	is	what	Gadamer	calls	a	‘question’:		The	essence	of	the	question	is	the	opening	up,	and	keeping	open,	of	possibilities.	If	a	prejudice	becomes	questionable,	in	view	of	what	another	or	a	text	says	to	us,	this	does	not	mean	that	it	is	simply	set	aside	and	the	other	writing	or	the	other	person	accepted	as	valid	in	its	place.	It	shows,	rather,	the	naiveté	of	historical	objectivism	to	accept	this	disregarding	ourselves	as	what	actually	happens.	In	fact	our	own	prejudice	is	properly	brought	into	play	through	its	being	at	risk.	Only	through	its	being	given	full	play	is	it	able	to	experience	the	other’s	claim	to	truth	and	make	it	possible	for	he	himself	to	have	full	play.42		Not,	then,	by	discarding	my	personal	prejudices	from	the	outset	as	the	requirement	for	scientific	objectivity	usually	requires,	but	by	putting	them	to	the	test	in	a	question.	So	not	by	bracketing	out	my	personal	views	on	the	political	benefits	of	a	trained	legal	bureaucracy	merely	because	they	are	’personal’,	but	by	setting	them	up	against	contrasting	views	on,	for	example,	how	that	legal	
																																																								42	Gadamer,	Truth	and	Method,	266.	
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bureaucracy	in	fact	emphasizes	certain	middle-class	values	and	policies	that	I	may	be	blind	to.	How	does	the	question	unravel	itself?	A	text,	even	if	it	may	be	distant	in	time	or	in	space,	suddenly	speaks	to	us.	The	pledge	of	a	victim	to	crime	in	her	statement	to	the	court,	a	feminist	analysis	of	how	gender	configures	in	the	world	of	law,	even	a	work	of	literature	like	a	tragedy	by	Sophocles	or	Shakespeare;	suddenly	a	text	‘resonates’.	It	‘makes	sense’,	and	the	interpreter	becomes	aware	of	a	connection	even	if	a	conventional	understanding	of	who	she	is	and	what	she	does	would	suggest	that	the	text	in	question	is	rather	distant	in	relation	to	the	what	the	legal	researcher	should	be	doing.	The	prejudices	of	the	legal	researcher’s	own	normative	tradition	may	want	to	resist	the	resonance	through	exclusion,	but	the	legal	critic	may	be	willing	to	risk	her	own	prejudices	by	putting	them	into	play	and	by	allowing	the	other	to	have	her	say.	Face	to	face	with	such	seemingly	distant	familiarities,	the	legal	researcher	can	do	one	of	two	things.	She	can	either	disregard	them	because	her	discipline	informs	her	that	they	are	’unscientific’,	‘irrelevant’,	’methodologically	unsound’,	or	what	have	you,	or,	as	Gadamer	suggests,	she	can	embrace	them	and	put	them	to	the	test	against	her	own	prejudices	before	deciding	about	their	worth.	But	this	can	work	in	the	opposite	way,	as	well.	Being	politically	impatient	as	we	often	are,	we	may	feel	tempted	to	discard	the	‘baggage’	of	a	tradition	that	seems	to	be	preventing	us	from	getting	on	with	things.	But	engaging	with,	for	example,	the	pure	theory	of	law	may	also	clarify	how	the	tradition	of	legal	positivism	more	generally	exercises	its	normative	hold	over	the	production	of	legal	knowledge.	We	may	be	able	to	question	the	hostility	of	legal	positivism	towards	certain	approaches	in	law,	its	corresponding	fascination	with	regulated	knowledge	and	the	method	that	will	supposedly	produce	it,	its	belief	in	the	explicative	power	of	formal	concepts,	and	so	on.	And	by	putting	such	issues	into	play	in	the	question,	we	may	well	get	a	valuable	glimpse	of	where	we	could	be	ourselves	heading.	Perhaps	it	is	unusual	to	suggest	that	a	’humanist’	approach	like	hermeneutics	could	offer	a	model	for	the	legal	critic	that	goes	beyond	mere	criticism.	But	even	some	approaches	that	are	more	commonly	associated	with	
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critical	legal	research	share	a	certain	kinship.	For	example,	Silja	Freudenberger	suggests	that	Gadamer’s	hermeneutics	offers	an	inspiration	and	ally	—	but	not	necessarily	a	model	—	for	feminism	on	many	interrelated	levels.43	I	will	re-formulate	Freudenberger’s	more	general	observations	here	with	specific	reference	to	legal	research.	Firstly,	feminist	approaches	to	law	and	hermeneutics	both	depart	from	a	critique	of	the	propositional	concept	of	knowledge	and	reject	the	methodological	ideals	of	modern	science	that	underpin	that	concept.	The	starting	point	of	both	more	conventional	approaches	to	legal	research	and	Kelsen’s	pure	theory	of	law	is,	of	course,	quite	the	opposite:	to	construct	legal	propositions	and	concepts	by	adhering	to	a	scientifically	sound	methodology.	Secondly,	feminist	approaches	to	law	and	hermeneutics	both	endorse	a	non-patronizing	and	open	relationship	with	the	other	and	what	she	may	have	to	say	whereas	conventional	approaches	to	legal	research	do	not	seem	to	include	any	such	dialogical	elements.	The	tone	of	conventional	legal	research	is	exclusive	rather	than	inclusive	as	Kelsen’s	notion	of	’purification’	already	reveals.	Thirdly,	feminist	approaches	to	law	and	hermeneutics	both	include	a	fundamental	recognition	of	the	historical,	cultural	and	social	situatedness	of	interpreters	rejecting	any	claims	to	the	type	of	universal	and	unattached	perspective	that	the	’objective’	ideal	of	conventional	approaches	suggests.	Fourthly,	feminist	approaches	to	law	and	hermeneutics	both	recognize	that,	on	account	of	the	fundamental	situatedness	of	all	interpreters,	the	existence	of	differing	voices	is	not	considered	as	a	flaw	or	a	weakness	but,	rather,	as	an	inevitability,	whereas	Kelsen’s	brand	of	positivism	would	rather	‘purify’	legal	research	from	all	such	deviations.	Finally,	feminist	approaches	to	law	and	hermeneutics	both	call	for	reflection	on	one’s	own	position	and	one’s	vested	interests	in	research	and	academic	work	whereas	the	only	explicit	aim	of	conventional	approachers	to	law	is	the	supposedly	disinterested	pursuit	of	knowledge.	So	the	legal	researcher	does	not	partake	in	tradition	by	prudently	following	the	normative	demands	of	her	discipline	and	by	enclosing	herself	into																																																									43	Silja	Freudenberger,	'The	Hermeneutic	Conversation	as	Epistemological	Model'	in	L	Code	(ed),	Feminist	Interpretations	of	Hans-Georg	Gadamer	(Pennsylvania	State	University	Press,	University	Park,	PE	2003).	
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its	limited	world	but,	as	Gadamer	expresses	it,	by	allowing	the	other	to	speak.	This	is	by	no	means	an	uncritical	encounter.	Far	from	it.	Within	tradition,	the	legal	researcher	encounters	the	other	with	her	own	prejudices,	and	the	encounter	takes	place	in	the	form	of	a	question.	The	legal	researcher’s	prejudices	are	the	‘legal	baggage’	that	she	by	necessity	carries	with	her,	and	through	questions	she	evaluates	whatever	it	is	that	she	has	encountered	by	understanding	it	in	a	particular	way:	she	unravels	history	‘as	a	legal	researcher’,	she	conceptualizes	society	‘as	a	legal	researcher’,	she	reads	literature	‘as	a	legal	researcher’,	and	so	on.	But	at	the	same	time,	she	develops	an	awareness	of	the	baggage	that	she	is	carrying	with	her.	Instead	of	throwing	it	all	hastily	overboard	and	proceeding	to	criticize	perhaps	prematurely,	the	encounter	invites	her	to	review	what	her	position	‘as	a	legal	researcher’	involves	and	whether	it	contributes	anything	valuable	to	her	understanding	of	the	world.		
Resonance			In	other	words,	the	legal	researcher	is	part	of	a	tradition	only	if	she	can	question	the	other	and	be	herself	put	into	question	by	it.	So	one	possible	response	to	the	question	‘How	can	critical	legal	research	change	law?’	could	well	be:	the	legal	critic	can	change	law	by	partaking	in	its	tradition.	But	this	requires	that	tradition	is	not	understood	in	a	normative	way.	The	normative	tradition	of	legal	positivism	in	general	and	Kelsen’s	pure	theory	of	law	in	particular	both	oblige	the	legal	researcher	to	follow	prescribed	conceptual,	epistemological	or	methodological	rules.	Research	into,	for	example,	lay	participation	in	law	must	be	conducted	in	particular	ways,	and	the	sanction	for	doing	otherwise	is	a	negative	assessment	of	the	results.	As	such,	these	rules	do	not	allow	for	the	resonance	of	the	question.	On	the	other	hand,	a	dialogical	tradition	such	as	the	legal	critique	that	I	am	advocating	here	offers	the	researcher	the	possibility	to	allow	that	resonance	to	grow	into	ever	new	questions	the	answers	to	which	lead	to	yet	new	questions.	Tradition,	then,	reveals	itself	to	the	legal	researcher	in	this	resonance,	in	the	seemingly	unlikely	familiarities	that	she	first	questions	through	her	own	
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prejudices	and	that	consequently	also	put	her	and	her	prejudices	into	question.	Through	the	resonance	of	tradition	the	legal	critic	can	become	aware	of	the	self-imposed	limitations	that	prevent	her	from	seeing	the	wider	picture.	But	her	response	is	not	an	alternative	’critical’	legal	method	that	would	limit	her	in	more	or	less	similar	ways	but,	rather,	an	attitude	and	a	willingness	to	continuously	question	and	to	be	put	into	question.	So	hopefully	my	own	fascination	for	the	Germans	is	at	least	partly	justified.	There	may	very	well	be	more	conventional	or	established	critical	perspectives	like	Marxist	or	feminist	approaches	that	I	should	at	least	consider	as	my	starting-points.	But	there	is	also	an	argument	to	be	made	for	developing	critical	departures	from	the	tradition	that	one	comes	from	by	engaging	with	it	in	critical	dialogue.	Otherwise	the	legal	critic	runs	the	risk	of	unwittingly	carrying	that	tradition	with	her	by	blindly	swapping	one	normative	tradition	for	another.		
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